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Abstract 
There  is  widespread  dissatisfaction  amongst  employers  with  defined  benefit  pension 
schemes, and many are switching to defined contribution schemes. Career average is a 
form of defined benefit scheme that has some important advantages over final salary 
schemes. The comparison of career average and final salary schemes is a neglected area, 
and this paper offers one of the first in-depth analyses of this topic. It considers the 
advantages  and  disadvantages  of  a  cost  neutral  switch  to  a  career  average  re-valued 
earnings (CARE) scheme. 
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Introduction
There is widespread dissatisfaction amongst employers with defined benefit pension schemes,
and many are switching to defined contribution schemes. In 1997 34% of workers were in a
defined benefit scheme, but by 2005 this had fallen to just 19% (PPF and TPR, 2006). However,
a form of defined benefit scheme exists with a number of important advantages over final salary
schemes. This offers an attractive alternative to switching away from defined benefit. Interest in
switching to a career average scheme has recently increased, as they offer a viable alternative to
final salary schemes, while maintaining the defined benefit structure. This paper sets out the
advantages and disadvantages of a cost neutral switch from a final salary to a career average
revalued earnings (CARE) scheme.
If markets are complete, pension scheme design is irrelevant (McCarthy, 2005). In such a world,
whatever the type of pension scheme, employers and scheme members can always rearrange their
portfolio of assets and liabilities and the division of compensation between wages and pension
to give them the same desired outcome. Therefore markets can be used to reconfigure any initial
allocation into the desired allocation, and the design of the pension scheme is irrelevant.
However, the real world does not offer complete markets because there are transaction costs,
constraints, missing markets, moral hazard, etc.; and so pension scheme design, such as the
choice between career average and final salary schemes, does matter. An important aspect of the
design of a pension scheme is the way the various inherent risks are shared between the employer
and members, and career average schemes share salary risk in a different way to final salary
schemes. They also distribute pension scheme benefits between members differently from final
salary schemes.
Section 1 summarizes the design of career average schemes, while section 2 investigates some
possible meanings of the term “cost neutral” in the context of switching to a career average
scheme. Section 3 sets out the alternative choices that are available when selecting the
revaluation rate, and section 4 provides evidence on the recent adoption of career average
schemes. Sections 5 and 6 summarize the advantages and disadvantages for both employers and
members of career average schemes, relative to final salary schemes. Section 7 analyses the
redistributive effects of a cost neutral move to a career average scheme, along with a numerical
example; and the conclusions appear in section 8.ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2007-06
 They assumed five categories of active member; with 1% earning €200,000, 4% earning €100,000, 15%
1
earning €80,000, 20% earning €60,000 and 60% earning €40,000; and that members’ salaries increased
each year due to three factors - salary rates (1.7%), promotions (2.5%) and last year’s inflation.
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1. Career Average Defined Benefit Schemes 
A career average scheme is still a defined benefit scheme, but with an important difference in
how the pension is calculated. In a final salary 80  scheme each accrued year earns an additional
ths
pension of the final salary, divided by 80. This can be re-expressed as the salary for that year
uprated to retirement using that person’s actual rate of salary increase (including promotional
increases), divided by 80. For a career average revalued earnings 80  scheme each accrued year
ths
earns an additional pension of the salary for that year uprated to retirement using a specified
revaluation rate, divided by 80.
The usual revaluation rate used in career average schemes is the retail price index (RPI), although
some alternatives will be considered in section 3. The same rate is often applied to the accrued
benefits of both active and deferred members. Actuaries argue that salaries generally increase
faster than RPI, and so ceteris paribus, a career average scheme revalued using RPI, gives lower
pensions than a final salary scheme. This lower cost of a career average scheme can be offset by
increasing the benefits, e.g. moving from an 80  scheme to say a 60  scheme, so that total
ths ths
expected cost is unaltered, i.e. the switch is cost neutral. Blome, Fachinger, Franzen,
Scheuenstuhl and Yermo (2007) found that using FRS 17 (or IAS 19), a switch from final salary
to career average (both with price indexation) but with no change in the accrual rate leads to a
reduction of over 40% in pension liabilities . Therefore whether or not a switch to career average
1
is cost neutral can have major implications for the benefits.
2. Cost Neutrality
A number of recent proposals to switch from final salary to career average have been “cost
neutral”. However, cost neutrality is ambiguous as it could mean cost neutral to: (a) the scheme,
(b) the employer, or (c) the scheme members. In each case the time period covered in the
calculation of the change in costs is generally the long term. All other aspects of the scheme are
assumed to be unchanged. In order that the proposal to switch to a career average scheme can be
properly evaluated, it is important to have a clear definition of what is meant by cost neutrality.
(a) Scheme. Cost neutrality to the scheme is probably the most obvious definition, and coversICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2007-06
 The national insurance and income tax effects are considered further in section 7A.
2
 About two thirds of contributions to defined benefit pension schemes are usually paid by the employer,
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and the present analysis of deferred wages is directly relevant to employer contributions. Member
contributions, forming about one third of total contributions, are paid out of the member’s gross wages;
and represent an investment in the pension scheme. The money’s worth for one year’s investment by
members in career average pension schemes has been studied by Hári, Koijen and Nijman (2006).
Money’s worth is the expected present value of annuity payments per pound spent to purchase an annuity
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benefit payments by the scheme. This is the cost number that the actuary is likely to compute.
(b) Employer. Cost neutrality to the employer covers employer contributions, and any changes
in wages to offset alterations in pension benefits. It also includes the value of any non-pecuniary
effects that stem from the switch, such as changes in staff turnover, early and late retirement
patterns, the productivity of workers recruited and retained, and the risks of scheme funding (see
section 6A). If the government is also the employer, cost neutrality can include the additional tax
effects of the switch, as well as any effects on state pensions and benefits. For example, a career
average scheme leads to a reduction in the pensions received by high flyers, and a matching
increase in the pensions of low flyers (see section 7). Due to the progressive nature of the tax
system, this results in a decrease in the tax revenue received when these pensions are paid .
2
(c) Members. Cost neutrality to the members covers their contributions to the scheme, and any
changes in wage rates to offset alternations in pensions, as well as the value of non-pecuniary
items, such as the removal of the pension capital loss (see section 5A) on becoming a deferred
pensioner, and the ability to accrue pension on fluctuating emoluments (see section 5B).
Once cost neutrality has been defined, its computation depends crucially on a number of
forecasts. These include the extent to which salary rises will exceed the chosen revaluation rate,
the effect of removing the pension capital loss, the influence of the switch on wage rises which
are now less costly, and the consequences of changing pensions on the wage-pension trade-off
(see section 6A). Therefore the extent to which a switch is cost neutral is always a matter for
legitimate debate. For the remainder of this paper cost neutrality refers to the scheme.
3. Choosing the Revaluation Rate
A key decision for any career average scheme is the choice of revaluation rate used to uprate
accrued benefits. Viewing pensions as deferred wages ; the revaluation (or dynamization) rate
3ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2007-06
or pension. Hári, Koijen and Nijman (2006) show that young uneducated males have an incentive not
to join career average pension schemes. A money’s worth analysis of a final salary scheme would
probably produce an even clearer case for not joining. The money’s worth of member contributions is
not covered in the present paper.
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can be set to meet various definitions of maintaining the value of the wages whose payment has
been deferred. 
1RPI. The most popular revaluation rate is RPI, which maintains the purchasing power of
the deferred wages.
2LPI. In the UK there is a legal obligation to revalue deferred benefits by at least limited
price inflation (LPI), and this can also be applied to revaluing the benefits of active
members.
3NAE. Another possibility is to maintain the rate for the job, i.e. if the work had been
performed today, what would be the wage rate (Cooper, 1998). Such revaluation of
deferred wages is often proxied by the increase in national average earnings (NAE).
Alternatively, wages could be revalued using the average rate of wage increases for the
employer concerned. Provided the member is not promoted, such revalued wages may
end up close to the members’s final salary.
4Final Salary. Wages may be revalued at the member’s actual wage rate, i.e. a final salary
(FS) scheme. In some final salary schemes the salary used in the benefit calculation is not
the final year, but the (revalued) average over the final 5 or 10 years. Such a modification
moves a final salary scheme towards a career average scheme.
5Riskless Rate. A fifth possibility is to view deferred wages as a risk free loan by the
member to the company, and so wages are revalued using the riskless rate of interest (r).
6Investment Return. Since the deferred wages have been invested by the pension scheme,
wages can be revalued by the rate of return achieved by the fund on its assets (R). In this
case the scheme becomes essentially a defined contribution scheme, with the investment
risk passed to the members (Disney, 1995, Thornton, 1986).
7Zero. Finally, the revaluation rate may be zero, i.e. no revaluation, and only the nominal
value of the deferred wages is preserved.
The likely ordering of these alternative revaluation rates over the long run is R > FS > r > NAE
> RPI > LPI > 0. Farr (2007) has proposed a new type of career average scheme where the
revaluation rate is conditional on the funding status of the scheme, thereby sharing the
revaluation risk with the members. A similar approach is taken by Dutch pension schemes.ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2007-06
 The use of career average is common practice in the state earnings related pension schemes offered by
4
many developed countries.
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The choice of revaluation rate depends on a range of factors, which include:-
• the expected size of the revaluation rates.
• the year to year volatility of the revaluation rates.
• the ease of making accurate long term forecasts of the revaluation rates.
• the availability of financial instruments to hedge revaluation rate risk.
• the extent to which the employer has control of the revaluation rates.
These factors are discussed below in sections 5, 6 and 7 below.
4. The Adoption of Career Average Pension Schemes 
In 1963 29% of the members of UK occupational pension schemes were in career average
schemes (Wesbroom and Reay, 2005). However, as inflation increased, career average schemes
declined in popularity because the absence of revaluation rendered the resulting benefits
inadequate (Thornton, 1986). By 1987 less than 1% of members of UK occupational schemes
were in career average schemes; and this remained the case until 2000. The introduction of career
average revalued earnings (CARE) schemes overcame this shortcoming, and in recent years there
has been an increasing interest in career average schemes. UK companies switching their final
salary schemes to career average, or offering a career average scheme along side another type of
scheme include the Bank of England, British Airways, the British Broadcasting Corporation,
Clydesdale Bank, the Co-operative Group, E.ON, First Group, Morgan Crucible, Mothercare, the
Nationwide Building Society, Royal and Sun Alliance, Sainsbury’s, Scottish & Newcastle,
Standard Life, Tesco, Union Bank of Switzerland, Unilever and the Yorkshire Bank.
In addition, the UK government has shown a strong interest in career average schemes. The State
Second Pension (S2P) is a career average scheme, as were its predecessors, the State Earnings
Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) (1975-2002), and the Graduated Retirement Benefit (1961-
1975) . In addition, local councillors, general practitioners and dentists have career average
4
schemes. In 2005 and 2006 the UK government proposed that the pension schemes for staff in
the National Health Service (NHS), Civil Service and local government should switch from final
salary to career average.ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2007-06
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A. Civil Service. In December 2004 the government issued proposals for reform of the Civil
Service final salary scheme which included a cost neutral switch to career average (Cabinet
Office, 2004). The reaction of the Civil Service trade unions to the career average proposal was
mixed. Mark Serwotka, general secretary of the Public and Commercial Services (PCS) union
with 330,000 mainly lower paid Civil Service members, said that a move to career average
pensions would create “great uncertainty, suspicion and anxiety” (The Financial Times, 9
th
December 2004). However, 15 months later his views had mellowed, and he said that the “PCS
does not have a policy of support for career average pension schemes. The jury is still out on the
benefits of such schemes and the union is yet to be convinced about the need to move to a career
averaging scheme. Talks are continuing between the Civil Service trade unions and the
government with a deal of the detail yet to be worked through. Only then can a view be taken on
the merits of career averaging over a final salary pension scheme” (The Socialist Worker, 11
th
March 2006). 
Prospect, the trade union representing 60,000 scientists, engineers and other specialist Civil
Service workers said that career average was an opportunity rather than a threat, and would be
superior to the present arrangements (The Financial Times, 10  December 2004). The First
th
Division Association (FDA), which represents top civil servants, opposed the introduction of a
career average scheme and voted for strike action over this and the proposed increase in the
retirement age (The Financial Times, 15  March 2005). In its consultation, 94% of FDA
th
members were opposed to moving to a career average scheme (FDA, 2005). 
The collective response of the Civil Service unions (CCSU, 2005) did not reject the concept of
a career average scheme, but criticised the way it had been presented in the consultation. The
career average aspect of the proposal was not understood by many staff, and insufficient evidence
was provided that it would be fairer for those working part time or taking career breaks. There
was also scepticism about the employer’s motives, since other employers have introduced career
average schemes to cut costs. The outcome was that from 1  August 2007 entrants to the Civil
st
Service were offered a new career average pension scheme in place of the existing final salary
scheme. 
B. NHS. In January 2005 the government consulted on a cost neutral switch of the NHS pension
scheme for England and Wales, which has 1.26 million active members, to career average (NHSICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2007-06
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Employers, 2005). A move to career average was strongly opposed by the Royal College of
Nursing (RCN, 2005), in part because the new NHS pay system, Agenda for Change, supported
greater career progression for nurses, making a final salary scheme more attractive than a career
average scheme (see section 7). The British Medical Association (BMA) saw the possible switch
to a career average scheme for all doctors as one of the greatest threats in the proposals. James
Johnson, chairman of the BMA, said that “over 95% of consultants and 93% of junior doctors
in the BMA survey want to stick with their current final salary scheme” (BMA, 2006). Modelling
by the BMA showed that full-time consultants with an NHS career from graduation to retirement
age could have their pensions reduced by 25%. Amicus, which has 100,000 NHS members, came
out against the career average scheme, mainly because they estimated that there would be many
more losers than winners amongst their members (Amicus, 2005). Amicus also made the point
that some of the benefits of a career average scheme can be obtained with a final salary scheme.
General Practitioners and dentists in the NHS have always had a career average scheme. This is
because they are self employed, which allows them to manipulate their final salary; and because
their earnings tend to peak in mid career (NHS Employers, 2005). In the BMA consultation, 75%
of general practitioners and dentists wished to continue with their career average scheme (BMA,
2006). A summary of the consultation responses on retaining a career average scheme for general
practitioners and dentists appears in tables 1 and 2 (NHS Employers, 2006a). These tables show
a clear preference for the retention of the career average scheme. As a result of the consultation
(which also included employers), the NHS decided to stick with a career average scheme for
general practitioners and dentists, and to keep a final salary scheme for all other staff.
C. Local Government. In June 2006 the UK government proposed four options for the local
government pension scheme for England and Wales, of which two were final salary, one was a
switch to career average, and the fourth was a combination of career average and final salary
(DCLG, 2006). The overwhelming response from members of Unison was for a final salary
scheme. Unison (2006a) believed that, to compensate members for the risk that the revaluation
rate may be less than actual salary rises, a more generous accrual rate was required, along with
changing the revaluation rate from RPI to NAE. Unison (2006b) reported that 84% of the
employers also preferred a final salary scheme. So the final decision was in favour of one of the
final salary schemes, and this comes into operation in April 2008.ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2007-06





For Career Average 6.0% 10.5% 5.0% 8.5%
For Final Salary 63.5% 46.5% 76.0% 50.0%
Do Not Know 30.5% 43.0% 19.0% 41.5%
Total Responses 5433 172 115 24






Agree  84% 98% 89% 100%
Disagree  16% 2% 11% 0%
Total Responses 678 47 18 4
Table 2: Responses Agreeing with the Retention of a Career Average Scheme for General
Practitioners and Dentists 
In these three government consultations, a number of common reasons were given by
respondents for opposing a switch to a career average scheme:-
• Career average is an unfamiliar concept, and is more difficult to explain and understand
than final salary.
• An unwillingness to move away from final salary, which is seen as the gold standard
pension scheme design that is widely trusted.
• Doubts about the ability of pension administrators to cope with the new career average
design.
• Fears that a career average scheme will cause problems with the public sector transfer
club.
• A fear that, while the proposal is meant to be cost neutral, it is actually a cost reduction
measure. 
• Women, who have taken less demanding jobs when young to allow them to raise a
family, did so expecting their final salary (and hence pension) to be unaffected. A shift
to career average would thwart such plans.
• Staff who experience above average salary growth lose out from a switch to a career
average scheme.ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2007-06
 It is assumed that the large wage rise does not cause the actuary to revise his or her expectations of
5
future rates of wage increase used when valuing the past service liabilities. 
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Career average schemes have recently increased in popularity in the Netherlands. The two largest
Dutch pension schemes: ABP, whose members are 2.4 million civil servants and teachers; and
PGGM, which has 1.9 million healthcare and social worker members; have recently switched to
career average. By 2004 three quarters of the active members of Dutch pension schemes were
in career average schemes (Wesbroom and Reay, 2005). Swinkels (2006) reports that the
following Dutch companies offer career average schemes:- ABN Amro, Aegon, Ahold, AKZO
Nobel, Hagemeyer, Heineken, KPN, Phillips, Reed Elsevier, TNT and Wolters Kluwer. In 2003
about 7% of the schemes run by large US companies were career average (Watson Wyatt, 2005).
5. Advantages of a Switch to a Career Average Scheme
This section sets out the benefits of switching to a career average scheme. The advantages of a
career average scheme, relative to a final salary scheme, are split into those which accrue chiefly
to the employer, and those received by scheme members. This classification is somewhat
arbitrary, as a benefit to the employer may be a disbenefit to the members. For the purposes of
this comparison, final salary schemes are assumed to base the pension on salary for the last
twelve months of employment, and to use a single contribution rate for all members; as do career
average schemes. 
A. Employer
1. A career average scheme reduces the risks and costs to the employer of a large pay rise for all
members. A large pay rise represents a double blow for an employer with a final salary scheme
because it results in a large one-off increase in the past service liability, together with a smaller
continuing increase in current salaries (and associated pension obligations). With a career average
scheme a big pay rise does not lead to an uprating of past service liabilities, unless the employer’s
wage rates are used for revaluation.
For example, suppose an employer has a £10 million pension liability for the past service of
active members, and an annual wage bill of £1 million. This employer now grants a wage rise
of 10%, which is 7% above inflation. With a final salary scheme the cost in the first year to the
employer is £11 m.×0.10 = £1.1 million, ignoring the extra pension cost of the higher wages in
the current year . Under a career average scheme with RPI revaluation, the extra cost to the
5ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2007-06
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employer is the increase in salary cost for the current year of £0.1 m. (and associated pension
obligations), plus the revaluation of the past service liability using RPI of £0.3 m., giving a total
additional cost of only £0.4 m. In general, for every extra 1% granted as a pay rise, the extra cost
for a final salary scheme is (0.01×Liabilities) higher than for a career average scheme. In this
example, the marginal cost for a final salary scheme of an extra 1% pay rise is £110,000, not the
£10,000 for a career average scheme. Even if changes in the revaluation rate are just as volatile
as changes in the firm’s average wage, the effect of wage rises on the past service liability of a
final salary scheme means that the resulting surplus or deficit for a career average scheme
reported in the accounts will probably be more stable than for the corresponding final salary
scheme. This may result in the contribution rate for a career average scheme also being more
stable.
2. Because a wage rise does not cause an uprating of the past service liability, members with a
career average scheme have less incentive to engage in industrial action for higher wages; and
career average schemes provide less incentive for members to seek large pay rises close to
retirement. Career average schemes also reduce the cost to the employer of awarding favoured
individuals large pay rises close to retirement.
3. If RPI is used as the revaluation rate, a career average scheme replaces final salary risk with
RPI risk. This makes it much easier for the employer to hedge this risk if desired, e.g. by holding
index linked bonds. There are no suitable instruments for hedging final salary risk (Sutcliffe,
2005). If the riskless rate is used as the revaluation rate, fixed interest securities can hedge this
risk. If the investment return is used to uprate past service, the investment portfolio of the
pension fund will exactly hedge this risk.
4. If the same revaluation rate is used for deferred and active members in a career average
scheme, staff turnover risk (i.e. the risk that an unknown proportion of the workers will cease to
be active members of the scheme) is removed when valuing the liabilities of the scheme. This
is because the cost to the scheme is the same whether the member stays or leaves. Removal of
this risk allows the current deficit or surplus to be measured with greater accuracy, and one
source of error disappears when forecasting future liabilities.
5. A final salary scheme using the projected unit method to value the liabilities requires forecastsICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2007-06
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of future salary increases, while a career average scheme using the projected unit method requires
forecasts of the revaluation rate. It may be easier to forecast the chosen revaluation rate, making
the valuation of the liabilities more reliable. For example, actuaries already make use of the
market forecasts of the long term inflation rate implicit in the price of index linked gilts, and this
can be used to forecast an RPI revaluation rate, while the riskless rate can be forecast using the
yield curve for government bonds.
6. A career average scheme reduces the incentive in a final salary scheme for members to stay
on to improve their pension (Cabinet Office, 2004). In a final salary scheme this incentive is
provided by the potential for a substantial pay rise, which then revalues all previously accrued
benefits. 
7. When designing a pension scheme, employers must ensure it complies with current legislation
concerning discrimination on the grounds of age, race, sex, disability, sexual orientation and
belief. They may also wish to anticipate future changes in anti-discrimination requirements. The
DCLG (2006) wanted the new local government scheme to be equality proof, and concluded that
career average schemes are superior in this respect. They are fairer as between long and short
service workers, and between high and low flyers (see section 7). The Cabinet Office (2004) also
wanted a career average scheme for the Civil Service in order to provide an equality proof
scheme. 
Despite these government worries about equality, the NHS and local government schemes chose
to continue with final salary; although the Civil Service scheme did not. This implies that the
government thinks any discrimination inherent in these two final salary schemes will continue
to be objectively justifiable. The advantages of final salary discussed in section 6A might be used
in such a justification. However, there is always the risk that circumstances change, and such a
defense is unsuccessful.
8. Because they are more equitable as between members, career average schemes are preferable
as the basis for multi-employer schemes (Thornton, 1986, Cooper, 2003). In a final salary multi-
employer scheme differential employer behaviour creates cross-subsidies. For example, the
pensions cost of large wage increases by one employer is spread across all employers. For a
career average multi-employer scheme, large wage increases do not revalue past service, and soICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2007-06
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do not result in a cross-subsidy. 
9. When scheme membership is voluntary, a final salary scheme is subject to adverse selection -
potential high flyers join, while those who expect a flat age-earnings profile do not. Since career
average schemes do not favour high flyers, this adverse selection is removed. Cocco and Lopes
(2004) conducted an empirical investigation into the presence of such adverse selection. UK
workers have a choice between three types of pension scheme (a) SERPS/S2P, which is career
average, (b) personal pensions, which are defined contribution, and (c) final salary occupational
schemes. They studied the pension scheme choices made by 46,000 workers in 1999-2001, after
controlling for the lower transfer value of occupational pensions and the lack of tax relief on
SERPS contributions. They found that workers with a job offering high earnings growth tended
to choose a final salary scheme, while workers facing low earnings growth tended to choose the
career average scheme. This evidence suggests that final salary pension schemes are subject to
adverse selection, which can be avoided by a switch to career average.
10. The use of career average offers the flexibility to change the revaluation rate and the
definition of pensionable pay from time to time, without creating the administrative problem of
tranches of past service that are necessary with a final salary scheme (Thornton, 1986, Wesbroom
and Reay, 2005). This flexibility in the revaluation rate offers the possibility that (for future
service) a career average scheme can become a final salary scheme, or change to something
similar to a defined contribution scheme.
11. Final salary schemes generate a pension capital loss when a member becomes a deferred
pensioner (Ippolito, 1991) as the revaluation rate for past service drops from the member’s actual
pay rise to the RPI (or LPI). The presence of this pension capital loss depends on taking an
“implicit contract” view of pensions, rather than a legal or spot interpretation (Ippolito, 1985).
Under the implicit contract view, a pension is valued now using the forecast salary as at the
normal retirement age (NRA), while the legal view uses the current salary. The empirical
evidence clearly supports the implicit contract view, e.g. Ippolito (1985). Some members of a
final salary scheme will require compensation for accepting this penalty for prematurely quitting.
Since a switch to a career average scheme with the same revaluation rate for active and deferred
members removes this penalty, it could lead to a corresponding reduction in wages (Ippolito,
1997).ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2007-06
 Assume that the variance of the revaluation rates is the same as that of the salary increases, and that
6
changes in the revaluation rate and salaries are both independent over time. Then pensions based on the
career average will be less risky than those based on the final salary.
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12. There is little difference in the administration costs of final salary and career average
schemes, Cooper (1997). Only the total revalued salary to date, weighted by the appropriate
accrual rate, need be recorded by a career average scheme.
B. Members 
1. By reducing the effect of pay rises on pension costs, a career average scheme makes it easier
for trade unions to negotiate larger pay rises; although workers have less incentive to seek such
rises.
2. Career average schemes make it easier for members to predict their pension. This is because
their pension forecast depends on the salary-weighted average of the revaluation rates across their
remaining years of service, and this may be easier to forecast than their own final salary, which
is based on their aggregate wage increase across the years to retirement . Based on a Monte Carlo
6
simulation using data from the Labour Force Survey, McCarthy (2005) concluded that career
average schemes are preferable to final salary schemes, which he attributes to the size of the
career average pension being less risky. 
3. A career average scheme is more attractive than a final salary scheme to workers who are risk
averse because revaluation rate risk is usually less than final salary risk.
4. Career average schemes using RPI as the revaluation rate give a pension that is guaranteed in
real terms, rather than being uprated by the final salary (and so subject to final salary risk). 
5. A cost neutral switch to using career average makes joining a pension scheme more attractive
to lower paid staff, particularly staff without good career prospects, and/or those with short
service (see section 7). This should increase the uptake of pensions by disadvantaged groups.
6. Final salary schemes often exclude from pensionable earnings any fluctuating emoluments
such as overtime, special payments, variable time employment etc because they are difficult to
deal with in the benefit calculation. In addition, treating overtime etc as pensionable pay for finalICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2007-06
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salary schemes opens up the possibility of members pushing up pay in their final year by working
excessive overtime etc. Career average schemes can easily include fluctuating payments in the
benefit calculation (Cabinet Office, 2004, Cooper, 1997, Thornton, 1986); while members
deliberately increasing their final year’s pay has much less effect in a career average scheme.
Therefore career average schemes tend to include all earnings. Cooper (2003) pointed out that
career average schemes are popular in the retail sector, which has many variable time workers.
7. The treatment of overtime etc as pensionable pay by career average schemes increases the
pensions of workers who receive such payments, unless there is some offsetting change.
8. Career average schemes are beneficial for members whose peak earnings are in mid career, e.g.
some manual workers (Thornton, 1986). Career average also allows members to step down to
lower paid, less demanding, possibly part time jobs as they approach retirement (Cabinet Office,
2004) without suffering a substantial pension reduction.
9. Since the revaluation rate does not depend on the member remaining in employment, the same
rate can be applied to deferred benefits, so ensuring equal treatment of active and deferred
members. Such equal treatment removes the pension capital loss suffered by staff when they
become deferred pensioners (Ippolito, 1991).
10. Because all past benefits in a final salary scheme are revalued by subsequent salary increases,
the employer has an incentive to dismiss members, particularly long standing members, of a final
salary scheme just before a large rise in salaries. Using data on US workers for 1966-81,
Cornwell, Dorsey and Mehrzad (1991) found evidence supporting such opportunistic behaviour
by employers. A career average scheme that uses the same rate for revaluing the benefits of
deferred and active members does not create this incentive for the employer. 
6. Disadvantages of a Switch to a Career Average Scheme
The disadvantages of career average schemes, relative to final salary schemes, are now presented
separately for the employer and the members. In points 3 to 6 below the changes in productivity,
staff turnover, training and salaries are only relevant to the measurement of cost neutrality if it
is defined with respect to the employer or members. In this paper, cost neutrality is taken to relate
to just the scheme, making such costs and benefits irrelevant to quantifying cost neutrality.ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2007-06
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However, these effects still need to be taken into account in assessing the costs and benefits of
a switch to career average.
A. Employer
1. The employer has control over each member’s final salary, and over the average rate of wage
increase for their workforce. However, the employer does not control RPI, the riskless rate, NAE
or the rate of return on the fund’s assets. Therefore, if any of these variables is chosen as the
revaluation rate for a career average scheme, the employer has lost control of this aspect of
pensions costs. However, since wages are usually set in the context of a competitive labour
market; the employer may not have meaningful long run control of final salaries and average
wage rates. 
2. It is common practice to use the same revaluation rate for active members and deferred
pensioners of a career average scheme. If RPI is used as the common revaluation rate the cost of
deferred pensioners is unchanged, but other choices of revaluation rate increase or decrease this
cost in the absence of any change in the accrual rate. For example the choice of NAE increases
the cost of deferred pensions. If the switch to career average is cost neutral (irrespective of the
common revaluation rate chosen), this implies a redistribution of pensions from active to deferred
members because FS > RPI.
3. Lazear (1979, 1981) has argued that it may be in the interests of both the employer and the
workers for there to be a penalty for workers who shirk or quit prematurely; with an incentive
for workers to stay and work hard. Such an outcome increases staff productivity, which can then
be shared between the workers and the company as higher wages and profits. Dorsey, Cornwell
and MacPherson (1998) found that offering a defined benefit, rather than a defined contribution
scheme, is linked with higher labour productivity. Ippolito (1991) suggests that workers can be
incentivised to stay and avoid being sacked for shirking by the introduction of a final salary
scheme which generates a pension capital loss for quitters and those sacked for shirking.
Therefore the introduction of a career average scheme may lead to a reduction in productivity
because members are not subject to the threat of a pension capital loss if sacked for shirking, and
this leads to a reduction in wages. To avoid such a reduction in productivity, the employer could
introduce a wage tilt, i.e. initial low wages and high final wages (Lazear, 1979, 1981), although
this may result in some additional tax payments.ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2007-06
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4. If the same rate is used for revaluing the benefits of active and deferred members, those who
leave the firm cease to suffer a pension capital loss (i.e. there is no reduction in the revaluation
rate on quitting). This may result in an increase in labour turnover and in the costs of recruiting
and training replacement staff. Using US data, Allen, Clark and McDermed (1993) found that
being a member of a final salary scheme clearly reduces staff turnover. This is due to both the
sorting effect of attracting workers who want to stay, and the presence of the pension capital loss
suffered by leavers which discourages quitting. An increase in staff turnover reduces the
willingness of the employer to invest in staff training because the firm may get less benefit from
the training, and less well trained staff will be less productive. Dorsey, Cornwell and MacPherson
(1998) found that offering a defined benefit pension scheme is associated with greater staff
training. 
5. A shift to a career average scheme may alter the type of staff who want to work for the firm,
i.e. there is a sorting effect (Ippolito, 1997). Pensions attract staff with personal attributes that
result in them placing a high value the type of scheme on offer, and these attributes may be those
desired by the employer, leading to higher productivity. A final salary scheme favours high flyers,
who are more willing to take a risk with the size of their pension, and are low discounters who
do not intend to quit. Low discounters attach a high value to long term consequences, and so
engage in less shirking, have a stronger desire for promotion, and appreciate the long term
consequences of their actions (Ippolito, 1997). Such staff are less willing to work for a firm with
a career average scheme, which tends to attract staff who are more risk averse low flyers with a
higher personal discount rate who intend to quit earlier. These staff may have lower productivity
and wages.
6. A cost neutral switch to a career average scheme increases the total compensation (pension
plus salary) of low flyers, and lowers the total compensation of high flyers (see section 7). This
raises the question of the extent to which members (and employers) take account of the deferred
wages provided by the pension scheme when negotiating employment contracts.
If markets are complete and participants are fully rational, the wage-pension trade-off will be a
one-for-one negative relationship. Salaries will change to offset any change in pension, and a
switch to a career average scheme will not produce any income redistribution. But in the
incomplete real world, the size of this trade-off is an empirical question. ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2007-06
 The following studies have estimated the size of the trade-off between pension benefit and wages: Clark
7
and McDermed (1986), Ehrenberg (1980), Ehrenberg and Smith (1981), Freeman (1985), Gunderson,
Hyatt and Pesando (1992), Montgomery and Shaw (1997), Montgomery, Shaw and Benedict (1992),
Moore (1987), Schiller and Weiss (1980), Smith (1981) and Smith and Ehrenberg (1983). In addition,
Bulow and Landsman (1985), Dorsey, Cornwell and MacPherson (1998), Even and MacPherson (1990)
and Gustman and Steinmeier (1995) have estimated the effect on wages of being covered by a pension
scheme. 
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Labour economists have studied compensating wage differentials, i.e. the extent to which wages
adjust to allow for the other costs and benefits of employment, such as danger, unpleasantness,
long holidays, free samples, security, fringe benefits, etc. Researchers have tried to quantify the
wage-pension trade-off  when the member’s own pension contributions are ignored; but they
7
have faced formidable data and econometric problems (Allen and Clark, 1987). The available
evidence is very mixed, but suggests that the relationship between wages and pensions is usually
negative, with no strong evidence that it is as large as one-for-one. This may partly be because
pensions bring the benefits of reduced turnover and greater staff productivity. There is also the
possibility that members, and perhaps employers, suffer from pensions illusion, i.e. not require
an offsetting increase in wages when their pension benefits are reducing, or not reduce wages
when pension benefits are increased.
Building the compensating effects of switching to a career average scheme into the wage
structure means that salaries at the top end will tend to rise, while those at the bottom end will
tend to fall. However, a final salary scheme rewards those who experience a substantial increase
in salary during their career, irrespective of where they start and finish on the salary scale.
Therefore compensation for a switch to a career average scheme cannot simply take the form of
increasing the salaries of the highly paid, and lowering the salaries of the lowly paid; it needs to
reflect career progression. In a risky world, the extent to which a particular member gains or loses
from a switch to career average is not known at the time they enter into a labour contract.
Therefore such contracts can either reflect expected gains or losses from a switch to career
average, or incorporate some retrospective element. In addition, there may be delays and
rigidities in adjusting wages for existing workers.
7. Using the same revaluation rate for leavers and stayers does not allow the employer to penalise
those members who quit before the NRA because the pension capital loss imposed on early
leavers has disappeared. Therefore early retirement is not discouraged. However, a cost neutral
switch to career average will probably increase the incentive for low flyers and some high flyersICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2007-06
 The effects of a switch from final salary to career average are likely to be small compared with the
8
effects of any actuarial reduction for early retirement, or actuarial enhancement for late retirement.
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to accrue additional years, rather than retire early. This is because the accrual rate has increased,
while the difference between the expected revaluation rate and salary increases over the final few
years will be small. Some high flyers may expect their pay rises to outstrip the revaluation rate
over their final years. In which case they have a stronger incentive than low flyers not to retire
early. Whether the incentive for high flyers to retire early has increased or decreased depends on
the relative magnitude of the increase in the accrual rate and the decrease in the revaluation rate .
8
B. Members
1. Final salary schemes promise members with a specified number of accrued years a pension that
is a specified proportion of their final salary, i.e. the replacement ratio is fixed. This means that
members can plan for any change in their standard of living as they move from employment to
retirement. With a career average scheme, the relationship between their final salary and pension
is uncertain (chiefly because their final salary is uncertain).
2. Without an increase in benefits (e.g. the accrual rate) to make the switch from final salary to
career average cost neutral, the introduction of a career average scheme will very probably
decrease total benefits. The losers will be the high flyers.
7. Redistribution Effects of a Switch to Career Average Pensions
A final salary scheme amplifies lifetime income inequality between members. Not only do high
flyers receive a large salary, but they also receive a pension which is a higher proportion of their
pension contributions than do low flyers. In addition, high flyers usually receive greater tax relief
than low flyers on their pension contributions, and probably draw their higher pensions for longer
due to their greater life expectancy. These effects further increase the inequality of lifetime
incomes (salary plus pension).
A cost neutral switch from a final salary to a career average scheme has a powerful effect on the
size of pension received by different groups of members (Cooper, 1997, 1998, 1999). Members
with a flat age-earnings profile (low flyers) are gainers, while members who display considerable
salary progression (high flyers) are losers. Being a high or low flyer tends to be correlated with
other characteristics of the member, and this suggests that the losers from final salary schemesICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2007-06
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tend to be uneducated non-white women who experience career breaks, work part time or
variable hours, who leave early. For example, a study of the NHS found that men receive about
10% more initial pension from their contributions than women as a result of higher career
progression (NHS Employers, 2005). Any changes in pension benefits caused by a switch from
final salary to career average may be compensated for by a change in wages, but there is a strong
possibility that any such adjustment is less than one-for-one. 
Pensions are deferred pay, and the concept of equal pay for equal work leads to the principle of
an equal pension for equal work. Career average schemes (where some common revaluation rate
is used, rather than final salary) give pension equality between active members of the same age,
who both perform the same work in the same year, and make the same pension contributions.
Thus career average schemes meet the objective of delivering equal pension for equal work.
However, a final salary scheme revalues accrued pension benefits by the rate of increase required
to reach the member’s final salary. This greatly favours members who experience rapid salary
increases, particularly if these increases are near the end of their service. These winners from a
final salary scheme tend to be educated white men who do not have career breaks, work full time
with fixed hours and do not leave early.
As well as equity between high and low flying active members, there is also the issue of equity
between deferred pensioners and active members. If two members of the same age perform the
same work in the same year for the same pay, the concept of equal pay for equal work implies
that they should also receive the same pension for this work; regardless of whether one of them
subsequently leaves the company. In a typical final salary scheme leavers have their benefits
revalued by RPI, while stayers have their benefits revalued by their final salary. This usually
means that leavers receive markedly less pension than stayers for identical deferred pay. If a
career average scheme uses the same revaluation rate for actives and deferreds, this inequity is
removed. However, some early leavers may choose to take a transfer value, rather than become
a deferred pensioner. Typical transfer values are substantially less than the economic value of the
accrued pension rights; and the issue of equity for leavers who choose to take a transfer value,
rather than a deferred pension, remains. 
The redistribution by final salary schemes from low to high flyers is not due to unequal incomes,
but to unequal rates of change in incomes. If initial incomes are highly unequal, but everyICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2007-06
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member receives the same pay rises throughout their career, there is no redistribution of pension
benefits. This means that members who experience a large promotion when young, and then
remain on the same grade until retirement, may gain from a switch to career average. It also
means that members who enter on a low salary, and are subsequently promoted to a middle level
salary late in their career, may lose from a switch to career average.
Den Hertog (1999) called the redistribution of pensions by final salary schemes from low to high
flyers “reversed solidarity”, and investigated why workers have negotiated such arrangements.
He attributes this reversed solidarity to the standardized non-negotiable pension deal offered to
individual workers, the substantial costs that workers must incur to understand the pension (or
to employ an advisor), the membership of the scheme by senior managers, and the lack of
importance that workers tend to give to distant events, such as retirement. 
Trade unions should be exempt from these problems when negotiating a pension scheme.
However, democratic organizations, such as trade unions, represent the preferences of the median
member, who tends to be older, more senior and closer to retirement than young members. Trade
union leaders tend to be even older than the median voter. Freeman (1985) argues that this should
lead to pension schemes in unionised firms favouring seniority (long service) for calculating
benefits. His empirical analysis of US data found that unionised firms are more likely to have flat
rate benefits, where benefits depend on the number of years of service, not salary. However, flat
rate benefits are uncommon in the UK, and there is no evidence that unionised firms have
pension schemes which favour long service, rather than high final salaries. 
A possible explanation for the presence of reverse solidarity in the UK is that trade unions tend
not to represent the interests of deferred pensioners, who have probably ceased employment with
the sponsor. By removing the pensions capital loss, a cost neutral switch to career average
represents a redistribution of pensions away from active members and towards deferred
pensioners, which damages the interests of the trade union’s current membership.
A. Compensatory Salary Changes, Pension Contributions, NIC and Income Tax
The redistributive effects of a switch to career average may be offset by compensatory changes
in gross salary. Such a change in gross salary causes changes in pension contributions, national
insurance contributions (NIC), and income tax paid by the member. Members’ pensionICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2007-06
 Their income tax falls due to the drop in gross salary. However, the fall in their pension contributions,
9
which are tax deductible, leads to a fall in their tax deductions. Since the members’ pension contribution
rate is usually much less than 100%, the drop in gross salary is much larger than the drop in tax
deductions; and the overall effect is a reduction in their income tax.
 It is assumed that the aggregate change in pension contributions is zero, which is consistent with a cost
10
neutral switch.
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contributions (which are tax deductible) are assumed to be a fixed proportion of gross salary,
members’ NIC (which are not tax deductible) are a regressive proportion of gross salary, and
income tax is a progressive proportion of the member’s gross salary after deducting their pension
contributions. 
Consider the extreme case of a change in pension accrual that is fully offset by a change in gross
salary. For low flyers the rise in the value of their pension accrual is exactly matched by a fall in
their gross salary, so that they experience no change in their gross compensation. However, the
salary reduction causes a fall in their pension contributions, NIC and income tax . This leads to
9
a rise in their net compensation, ignoring any subsequent tax effects flowing from the increase
in pension accrual. The opposite outcome applies to high flyers. Therefore, low flyers gain and
high flyers lose from a fully compensated switch to career average due to pension contribution,
NIC and income tax effects.
As well as redistributing net compensation from high to low flyers, even in the extreme case of
full compensation via changes in gross salary, there is probably a change in the aggregate net
compensation of members due to changes in aggregate pension contributions, NIC and income
tax paid by members. Since NIC for members are regressive (although flat for employers), and
income taxation is progressive, even after allowing for the effect of changes in pension
contributions on tax deductions; the aggregate effect of a fully compensated switch to career
average on net compensation summed across all members is unclear . Since, in absolute terms,
10
the degree of progression in income tax is greater than the regression in NIC, it is likely that the
net effect of a switch to career average is an overall reduction in members’ net compensation, and
an increase in NIC and income tax payments to the government.
At the other extreme, if the switch to career average does not result in any compensating change
in gross salary, there is no change in net salary, pension contributions, NIC or income tax for any
member, again ignoring any subsequent tax effects flowing from the change in pension accrual.ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2007-06
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B. Model of the Redistributive Effects of a Switch to Career Average. On the basis of her
stochastic simulations of various types of pension scheme, Cooper (2005) concludes that the
redistribution effect of moving from a final salary scheme to a career average scheme is
overstated. To explore this issue further a simple model is developed to examine the
redistributive effects of a cost neutral switch from final salary to career average. Assume for
simplicity that there are no benefits other than members’ pensions, there is no risk, deferred
pensioners have their final salary uprated by RPI, the career average salary for active and deferred
pensioners is uprated by the revaluation rate (RPI) and pensions can only be brought into
payment at the NRA. In which case the annual real pension for a member of a career average
scheme is :-
(1)
CA where S is the salary for the first year of service (e.g. 25 year olds), x  is the career average
accrual rate (e.g. 0.01666 or 60 ), w is the annual real rate of increase in wages, d is the
ths
revaluation rate per year, n is the number of years until the NRA, b is the first year of service and
e is the last year of service, where years of service run from 1 to n. 
For a member of a final salary scheme, the annual real pension is:-
(2)
FS where x  is the final salary accrual rate. The value of the fixed term annuity for the j  type of
th
j scheme (final salary or career average) of A per year for m years at the NRA are given by:-
(3)
where r is the real discount rate, and m is the number of years in retirement. The value of the
j contributions relating to a member at the time the pension starts being paid (TV) for the j  type
th
of scheme (final salary or career average) is:-
(4)
j where CR is the contribution rate for the j  type of scheme (final salary or career average) and
th
is the same fixed proportion of salary for all members of the scheme, and v is the annual real rateICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2007-06
 The inequality that type H members will very probably draw their pensions for a longer period than
11
type L members is ignored.
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of return on the invested contributions. 
FS The required contribution rate for the final salary scheme is that value of CR  which equates the
FS FS aggregate values of TV  and PV  (the value of final salary contributions at the NRA equals the
present value of the final salary pension at the NRA) across all scheme members. The equivalent
cost neutral career average scheme requires that the aggregate cost of the career average scheme
is the same as the aggregate cost of the final salary scheme. This is achieved by setting the career
CA FS CA FS average accrual rate (x ) so that, in aggregate, A =  A, which implies that, in aggregate, PV
CA FS CA = PV , and TV  = TV .
C. Numerical Example of the Redistributive Effects of a Switch to Career Average. Some
representative numbers are used in the simple model presented above to give an idea of the
possible magnitude of the redistributive effects of a switch from final salary to career average.
Consider a company which operates a final salary pension scheme with an accrual rate of 60
ths
and full price indexation. The company employs two types of full time worker (L and H), both
of whom can start work at 25 or later, retire at 65, and live for 20 years after retirement . All
11
workers join the pension scheme. The number of type L members is four times larger than the
number of type H members, and each type of member starts with an annual salary of £20,000 at
the age of 25. Type L members experience no real pay rise throughout their career, while type
H members receive a 3.5% real pay rise every year, retiring at 65 on a real salary of £76,507 (i.e.
3.8 times larger than for type L members). The company operates an age-for-wage policy, and
so late joiners start on a salary corresponding to their age. The real interest rate is assumed to be
1% per year, and the real rate of return on the fund’s assets is assumed to be 3%. 
(i) Final Salary. If every member joins the final salary scheme at 25 and retires at 65, the
resulting payments to, and contributions for, each member are set out in table 3; along with the
contribution and accrual rates. For type L members a contribution of £1,000 today generates a
real pension of £94.18 per year at the NRA; while for type H members it generates a real pension
of £178.24; i.e. 89% more for type H members. This shows that the use of a final salary pension
scheme amplifies the inequality in salaries. The lifetime salary (and pension contributions) of
type H members are twice those of type L members. However, the annual pension of type HICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2007-06
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members is almost four times larger than that of type L members.
Combined Final Salary Scheme - 40 Years L H Ratio
Total Contribution Rates (%) 21.3% 21.3% 1
Accrual Rate 60 60 1
ths ths
Present Value of Lifetime Pensionable Salary £663,261 £1,340,673 2.02
Present Value of Lifetime Pension Contributions £141,573 £286,167 2.02
Annual Real Pension £13,333 £51,005 3.83
Real Pension at 65 for a £1,000 Contribution Now £94.18 £178.24 1.89
Table 3: Final Salary Scheme Combining Type L and H Members - 40 Years Accrued 
If the type L and H members had been in separate final salary schemes, with each scheme
delivering the same pension as under the combined scheme, the resulting contribution rates and
pension contributions are shown in table 4. This reveals greater equality in the relationship
between contributions and pensions, with type H members now getting slightly worse value for
money than type L members. A contribution of £1,000 now buys a real pension of £125.99 per
year for type L members, and £115.28 per year for type H members, i.e. 9% less for type H
members.
Separate Type L and Type H Final Salary Schemes L H Ratio
Total Contribution Rates (%) 16.0% 33.0% 2.06
Accrual Rate 60 60 1
ths ths
Present Value of Lifetime Pensionable Salary £663,261 £1,340,673 2.02
Present Value of Lifetime Pension Contributions £105,824 £442,460 4.18
Annual Real Pension £13,333 £51,005 3.83
Real Pension at 65 for a £1,000 Contribution Now £125.99 £115.28 0.91
Table 4: Separate Final Salary Schemes for Type L and Type H Members - 40 Years Accrued 
This analysis of the separate final salary schemes indicates that in the combined final salary
scheme 5.3% of the type L members’ contribution rate represents a cross-subsidy to type H
members, with each type H member receiving a reduction of 11.7% in their contribution rate.
Each type H member pays contributions with a present value of £156,293 (or £3,907 per year of
service) less than would be the case in the absence of type L members. Each type L member
makes contributions with a present value of £35,749 (or £894 per service year) more than would
be the case if there were no type H members. This cross subsidy from type L to type H members
represents what Den Hertog (1999) called reversed solidarity. It increases the inequality in
pensions, which further increases the inequality in the distribution of lifetime incomes (salaryICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2007-06
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plus pension).
(ii) Career Average. A cost neutral switch from a final salary to a career average scheme (with
no compensating adjustment in wages), means that the accrual rate must rise from 1.66667% (or
60 ) to 2.1333% (or 47 ). Table 5 shows that a contribution of £1,000 by type L members buys
ths ths
a real pension of £120.55, while the corresponding figure for type H members is £126.06, i.e. 5%
higher. The switch to career average has almost eliminated the large pension cross subsidy from
type L to H type members that was present in the final salary scheme.
Combined Career Average Scheme - 40 Years L H Ratio
Total Contribution Rates (%) 21.3% 21.3% 1
Accrual Rate 47 47 1
ths ths
Present Value of Lifetime Pensionable Salary £663,261 £1,340,673 2.02
Present Value of Lifetime Pension Contributions £141,573 £286,167 2.02
Annual Real Pension £17,066 £36,074 2.11
Real Pension at 65 for a £1,000 Contribution Now £120.55 £126.06 1.05
Table 5: Career Average Scheme Combining Type L and H Members - 40 Years Accrued
(iii) Short Service. If a type L member joins a final salary scheme at 25 and becomes a deferred
pensioner after 10 years, for each £1,000 of contributions she or he receives a real pension at the
NRA of £81.62. The corresponding number for a type H member is £95.10, i.e. 17% more for
type H members. These amounts (shown in table 6) are markedly less than the corresponding
numbers for full service members in table 3. Relative to full service, short service type L
members of a final salary scheme suffer a reduction of 13% in real pension per £1,000 of
contributions, while for type H members there is a reduction of 47%. This indicates that, while
both types of member suffer if they leave a final salary scheme early, type H members suffer
much more.
Combined Final Salary Scheme - 10 Years L H Ratio
Total Contribution Rates (%) 21.3% 21.3% 1
Accrual Rate 60 60 1
ths ths
Present Value of Lifetime Pensionable Salary £191.320 £223,813 1.17
Present Value of Lifetime Pension Contributions £40,837 £47,773 1.17
Annual Real Pension £3,333 £4,543 1.36
Real Pension at 65 for a £1,000 Contribution Now £81.62 £95.10 1.17
Table 6: Combined Final Salary Scheme for Type L and H Members - 10 Years AccruedICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2007-06
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Table 7 shows the consequences for short service members if their employer switches to a career
average scheme. For both type L and H members the real pension per £1,000 of contributions is
approximately £104.50, and the inequality between types of member has been removed. Short
service members are markedly better off from being in a career average, rather than a final salary
scheme because the real pension per £1,000 of contributions for type L members has risen by
28%, and for type H members it has risen by 10%. Therefore short service members, both type
L and type H, are better off being in a career average scheme.
Combined Career Average Scheme - 10 Years L H Ratio
Total Contribution Rates (%) 21.3% 21.3% 1
Accrual Rate 47 47 1
ths ths
Present Value of Lifetime Pensionable Salary £191.320 £223,813 1.17
Present Value of Lifetime Pension Contributions £40,837 £47,773 1.17
Annual Real Pension £4,267 £5,005 1.17
Real Pension at 65 for a £1,000 Contribution Now £104.49 £104.77 1
Table 7: Career Average Scheme Combining Type L and H Members - 10 Years Accrued
The above numerical example shows that a cost neutral switch from final salary to career average
produces a substantial redistribution of pensions from high flyers to low flyers. At the moment
members who have a low and flat salary path subsidize those with a rapidly rising salary path,
particularly those with a large pay rise near retirement. A switch to career average would be a big
step in removing such cross subsidies from the poor to the rich. It has also been demonstrated
that career average substantially reduces the penalty from leaving early. Indeed, for type L
members, early leavers from the career average scheme get a better deal than full service
members of the final salary scheme.
8. Conclusions
Many employers are considering changing their pension provision, and one type of scheme that
deserves serious consideration is career average revalued earnings (CARE). This paper offers an
in-depth cost neutral comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of these two alternative
pension scheme designs.
Cost neutrality can be defined with respect to the scheme, the employer or the members. In this
paper cost neutrality is measured with respect to the scheme, removing the need to quantify some
hard-to-measure behavioural responses (e.g. staff turnover, the wage-pension trade-off, trainingICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2007-06
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and productivity) from this problem; although these factors still remain when assessing the costs
and benefits to the employer and members. 
Career average has increased in popularity in recent years, and the UK government has proposed
the use of career average for some very large public sector schemes. Career average retains the
advantages of a defined benefit scheme, while offering a much fairer distribution of pensions
between high and low flyers, and between early leavers and full service members. It also offers
an extensive range of other benefits for both the employer and members, with only a few minor
disadvantages. A switch to career average involves some risks, relative to staying with a final
salary scheme. Although the switch is designed to be cost neutral to the scheme, the actual
outcome may generate a deficit or surplus because the forecasts of movements in salaries and the
chosen revaluation rate are incorrect. In addition, the behavioural responses to the switch may be
better or worse than expected. 
A wide choice of revaluation rates is available for use by career average schemes, and by an
appropriate choice of the revaluation rate, final salary and defined contribution schemes can be
viewed as special cases of a career average scheme. In consequence, career average schemes have
the flexibility to move towards either of these other types of scheme design, if desired.
Numerical examples illustrate the substantial redistribution of pension that can accompany a cost
neutral switch from final salary to career average, moving the scheme much closer to “equal
pension for equal work”. In view of their substantial attractions, career average schemes deserve
to be considered more seriously by those redesigning pension provision. 
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